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INCOME IN RESPECT OF A DECEDENT
John S. Brownt
A taxpayer's death ends his taxation year.1 Income realized there-
after attributable in whole or in part to the decedent's lifetime activ-
ities is taxable, if at all, to his successors in interest. This income has
been the subject of three different schemes of income taxation.
Before the 1934 Revenue Act,2 a decedent's final income tax re-
turn included only income reportable under his lifetime accounting
method. A cash basis decedent reported income received; an accrual
basis decedent reported both income received and income accrued.4
Income not reported on the decedent's final return was never taxed.5
Nontaxation resulted from the combined effect of two sections, one
of which provided an exclusion from income and the other a new
income tax basis equal to the value of the property at taxpayer's death
for property, including interests in future income, acquired from a
decedent. 6 Subsequent receipts by decedent's successors were income
only to the extent they exceeded the value of the property at dece-
dent's death.7
Equality between cash and accrual basis decedents was achieved
by section 42 of the Revenue Act of 1934, which required that a tax-
payer's final return include all "amounts accrued up to the date of
his death."" Rights to nonaccruable income, which were includible
t Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University. B.S. 1957, Villanova University;
LL.. 1965, Cornell University.
1 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954,§ 443; Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(b)(1) (1969) [all section
references hereinafter are to the 1954 Code and the regulations thereunder unless other-
wise indicated]. The decedent and his estate are separate tax entities for which the execu-
tor makes separate income tax returns. §§ 6012(b)(1), (b)(4).
2 48 Stat. 680 (1934).
3 Antoinette B. Held, 3 B.T.A. 408 (1926), acquiesced in, V-1 Cuss. BuLL. 3 (1926);
O.D. 454, 2 CUM. BULL. 170 (1920).
4 See Drye, The Taxation of a Decedent's Income, 8 TAX L. REv. 201 (1953); Latham,
Income and Deductions of a Decedent, 2 U. So. CAL. 1950 TAx. INST. 513, 517.
5 E.g., United States v. Carter, 19 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1927); 2 J. MERTENS, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 12.100 (1967).
0 Section 102, formerly § 22(b)(3), 53 Stat. 10 (1939); § 1014(a), formerly § 113(a)(5),
53 Stat. 41 (1939); Nichols v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 241 (1927), cert. denied, 277 US. 584
(1928).
7 GCM 11473, XII-1 CuM. BULL. 91 (1933); GCM 8826, IX-2 Cutm. BULL. 194 (1930).
In determining the amount of a decedent's gross estate, executors are required to accrue
all income of 'the decedent up to the date of his death and treat it as a capital item in
the federal estate tax return. Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1(b) (1963).
8 48 Stat. 694 (1934). See H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1934), reprinted
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in decedent's estate, continued untaxed. Inevitably the scope of the
statutory term "accrued" was litigated,9 and the issue reached the Su-
preme Court in Helvering v. Enright.10 In that case, a lawyer on the
cash basis had been a member of a partnership, also on the cash
basis. The partnership agreement provided that the successor of a
deceased partner would receive his partnership percentage of the
earned portion of estimated receipts from unfinished partnership busi-
ness. This amount, the appraised value of decedent's services to the
date of death, was held to be "accruable" within the meaning of sec-
tion 42.11 In general, under Helvering v. Enright and the lower coulrt
decisions that followed,'12 any income rights reflected in decedent's
gross estate were considered accrued under section 42. This caused
inclusion in a taxpayer's final return of amounts that a living taxpayer
could have reported over several years and the collection of which
was deferred or uncertain.13
In order to continue to tax all income accrued up to the date of
death and to eliminate the hardship resulting from including in the
decedent's last taxation year amounts receivable over several years,
Congress in 1942 repealed section 42,14 restored normal cash and ac-
crual accounting rules to decedents' final income tax returns, and en-
acted section 126, which provided that "the amount of all items of
gross income in respect 6f a decedent" would be taxed to the person
in 1939-1 CuM. BULL. (Part 2) 554, 572; S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1934),
reprinted in 1939-1 CuMr. BULL. (Part 2) 586, 608; CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 7835, H.R.
REP. No. 1385, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 Cums. BULL. (Part 2) 627,
629.
9 See Parlin, Accruals to Date of Death for Income Tax Purposes, 87 U. PA. L. REV.
295 (1939).
10 312 U.S. 636 (1941).
11 The Court reasoned that accrual of compensation for work in progress was sound
in view of the purpose of § 42, which was "to cover into income the assets of decedents,
earned during their life and unreported as income, which on a cash return, would
appear in the estate returns." Id. at 644-45. The decision is said to be consistent with the
percentage-of-completion method of accrual accounting. Anderson & Coffee, Proposed Re-
vision of Partner and Partnership Taxation: Analysis of the Report of the Advisory Group
on Subchapter K, 15 TAx L. REv. 285, 337 & n.185 (1960).
12 E.g., Helvering v. McGlue, 119 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1941); Frederick C. Kirchner, 46
B.T.A. 578 (1942); Lewis C. Ledyard, 44 B.T:A. 1056 (1941), aff'd, 143 F.2d 243 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 727 (1944); George W. Wickersham, 44 B.T.A. 619 (1941).
13 The boundary of the applicability of § 42 was indicated in Tom L. Burnett, 2
T.C. 897 (1943), where the Tax Court held that the date-of-death value of crops and
livestock produced and owned by a cash basis decedent, unlike the date-of-death value of
a cash basis decedent's services, was not accruable in the taxpayer's final income tax
return. Id. at 903, acquiesced in, 1944 Cum. BULL. 4. Cf. Perry v. United States, 58-2 USTC
9587 (N.D. Miss. 1958); Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 366, 367.
14 56 Stat. 830 (1942).
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who actually received it, when he received it, as income of the same
nature and to the same extent as such amount would be income if
the decedent remained alive and received it.15 This treatment is con-
tinued by section 691(a)(1) of the current, law,"" which provides that
"[t]he amount of all items of gross income in respect of a decedent
which are not properly includible in respect of the taxable period in
which falls the date of his death or a prior period... shall be included
in the gross income for the taxable year when received" of the suc-
cessor in interest17 who acquires from the decedent "the right to re-
ceive the amount." Under section 691(a)(3) income in respect of a
decedent retains the same character in the hands of decedent's suc-
cessor as it would have had if the decedent had lived and received
it. Under section 1014(c) property representing a right to receive in-
come in respect of a decedent retains decedent's basis in the hands
of the successor.'8 Under section 691(b) enumerated deductions not
allowed to the decedent because not paid or accrued prior to death
are allowed to decedent's successor when the items are paid by him.
Section 691(c) allows decedent's successor an income tax deduction
for the estate tax attributable to the net value for estate tax purposes
of items of income in respect of a decedent.19
15 H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 -(1942); S. REP'. No. 1631, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 82 (1942). The changes were made by amending § 42 and § 43 and adding § 126
to the 1939 Code. Equal treatment for cash and accrual basis taxpayers was achieved by
amending § 42 to exclude from a deceased accrual basis taxpayer's last income tax return
amounts accruable only by reason of death. The changes were suggested by the Treasury.
See statement of Randolph E. Paul, Tax Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury, in
Hearings on H.R. 7387 (Revenue Revision of 1942) Before House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 81, 89 (1942). An additional Treasury recommendation, the
adoption of a carryover basis rule for property acquired from a decedent, was not enacted.
See generally Note, Income In Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section 126, 65 HARv.
L. REv. 1024 (1952).
16 H.R. R.P. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65, Appendix 218-20 (1954); S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 87-89, 373-76 (1954).
17 § 691(a)(1). The categories of successors in interest are (1) the decedent's estate,
(2) a person entitled to receive the amount directly from the decedent, or (3) a person en-
titled to receive the amount as a beneficiary through the decedent's estate. Transfer of
the unrealized right to receive income in respect of a decedent between the enumerated
successors in interest is not a taxable event. However, § 691(a)(2) provides for a tax on
the value of the right if prior to realization there is a transfer to an outsider. Presumably
tax-free transfers of rights to income in respect of a decedent under § 351 or § 721 are
not possible. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-4 (1960). Compare § 453(d), as amplified by Treas. Reg.
§ 1.453-9(c)(2) (1965) and id. § 1.721-1(a) (1960).
18 Section 1014(c) was preceded by Treas. Reg. 118, § 19.126(a)-1(e) (1943), adopted,
1943-1 Cum. BuLL. 198, 205.
19 Presumably, the deduction for estate taxes was intended to provide approximately
the same tax consequences in the case of a decedent whose gross estate includes claims to
income as in the case of a decedent all of whose income receivables had been collected
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Section 691 dictates how income in respect of a decedent is to
be taxed, but the key statutory phrase, "items of gross income in
respect of a decedent," is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code. 20
The missing definition is vital to an understanding of the relationship
between sections 1014(a) and 691. Section 1014(a) provides that property
at decedent's death receives a basis equal to its value at death; property
covered by section 691 constitutes the main exception to this rule as
such property retains the decedent's basis. Legatees of appreciated
property recover its date-of-death value free from income tax because
this value is their basis for gain, loss, or depreciation; legatees of
appreciated property treated as the right to receive income in respect
of a decedent include in income the excess in value over decedent's
basis when they receive it.
The regulations assume the pertinent property interest is an item
of gross income, as distinguished from other kinds of property, and
then define "income in respect of a decedent" as
those amounts to which a decedent was entitled as gross income but
which were not properly includible in computing his taxable
income for the taxable year ending with the date of his death or
for a previous taxable year under the method of accounting em-
ployed by the decedent.2 '
The reference to "amounts to which a decedent was entitled as gross
income" presumably refers to property representing gain as distin-
guished from property representing the decedent's invested capital,
which may be returned free from income tax.
The primary rule under section 691 is that any income accrued
but not received at the date of the death of a decedent on the cash
(and income tax paid thereon) prior to his death. 2 MERTENS, supra note 5, at § 12.102(b).
The literal application of § 691(c)(1)(A) in a situation where the maximum amount of a
§ 691(a) item payable in installments is indeterminate could result in an income tax
saving in excess of the estate tax paid. For discussion of the deduction see 2 ALI FED. IN-
COME TAX STAT. 476 (Feb. 1954 Draft); Holland, Kennedy, Surrey, & Warren, A Proposed
Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Trusts and Estates-American Law In-
stitute Draft, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 316, 371 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Holland]. The Amer-
ican Bar Association's Section of Taxation has recommended substitution of a tax credit
for the allowed deduction. XIV ABA SECTION OF TAXATION BULL. 105 (1960).
20 Section 691(a)(4) provides that an amount equal to the excess of the face amount
of an installment obligation under § 453 over its basis in decedent's hands is income in
respect of a decedent. For proposed definitions of "income in respect of a decedent," see
FINAL REPORT OF SUBCHAPTER j ADVISORY GROUP, Hearings on H.R. 3041 Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 323 (1959); 2 ALI FED. INcoME TAX
STAT. § X890, 150 (Feb. 1954 Draft); XVI ABA SECriON OF TAXATION BULL. 182 (1963).
21 Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-1(b) (1965). See Rev. Rul. 58436, 1958-2 Cut. BuLL. 366,
368, modified, Rev. Rul. 64-289, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 173.
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basis constitutes income in respect of a decedent.22 Thus, section 691
covers such accrued income as fees for professional services, 23 salary,24
interest,25 rent,26 alimony,27 royalties, 2 declared dividends where the
record date precedes death,29 and most rights to payments received
from completed sales.3 0 The regulations indicate that the definition
of "income in respect of a decedent" extends beyond accrual account-
ing concepts to include income to which the decedent had only a
contingent claim at the time of his death.3 1
In describing the current concept of income in respect of a de-
cedent it is convenient to organize the judicial and administrative
materials around transactions or sources of income. Whether pay-
ments to decedent's successors will be treated as income in respect
of a decedent depends, in the first instance, on a characterization of
the payment as compensation, gain on a sale, rent, or royalty income.
In characterizing income, preparatory activities are disregarded even
though a substantial part of the income results therefrom. For example,
where a taxpayer owns property produced by his own services, the in-
come from the property will not be treated as compensation, but as
rent or royalties or as gain from the sale of property. After character-
22 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.691(a)-1(b)(1), (2) (1965). Regulation § 1.451-1(a) provides: "Under
an accrual method of accounting, income is includible in gross income when all the
events have occurred which fix the right to receive such income and the amount thereof
can be determined with reasonable accuracy."
23 Midland Natl Bank of Billings v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 736 (D. Mont.
1959).
24 Ralph R. Huesman, 16 T.C. 656 (1951), afl'd on other grounds, 198 F.2d 133 (9th
Cir. 1952); Rev. Rul. 64-150, 1964-1 CuM. BuLL. (Part 1) 448; Rev. Ru!. 59-64, 1959-1
Cum. BuLL. 31; Rev. Rul. 55-229, 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 75.
25 Levin v. United States, 373 F.2d 434 (Ist Cir. 1967) (accrued discount income);
Richardson v. United States, 294 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 802 (1962);
Marshal L. Noel, 50 T.C. 702 (1968) (accrued interest and discount income); Herbert
Payson, Jr., 18 T.C.M. 686 (1959); Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b), example (3) (1960); id.
§ 1.483-1(b)(3) (1966) (imputed interest); Rev. Rul. Q4-104, 1964-1 Cum. BuLL. 223.
26 Rev. Rul. 64-289, 1964-2 Cum. BuLL. 173.
27 Sarah L. Narischkine, 14 T.C. 1128 (1950), af'd per curiam, 189 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.
1951).
28 Rev. Rul. 60-227, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 262; Rev. Rul. 57-544, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 361.
29 While regulation § 1.301-1(b) taxes dividends when received, the stockholder is
the owner of the dividend after the record date. See Putnam v. Commissioner, 324 U.S.
393 (1945); Hattie L McNary, 47 T.C. 467, 470-71 (1967); cf. Rev. Rul. 64-308, 1964-2 Cm.
BuLL. 176.
30 Wilcox v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Ohio 1960); Dixon v. United States,
96 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. Ky. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 192 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1951); John A.
Biewer, 41 T.C. 191 (1963), aff'd, 341 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1965). Section 691(a)(4) defines
"income in respect of a decedent" to include the excess of the face amount of an install-
ment obligation over the decedent's basis therefor.
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-l(b)(3) (1965).
1970]
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ization, tests appropriate to the type of income involved are applied to
determine if it is income in respect of a decedent.
RIGHTS TO INCOME FROM PERSONAL SERVICES
Any inherited right to income attributable to decedent's per-
sonal services is an item of income in respect of a decedent. Thus
accrued income,32 income not accrued at death but to which the
decedent had a legally enforceable right to payment in the future,33
and income to which decedent had no enforceable right34 have all
been held to be income in respect of a decedent. The courts have
simply concluded that any income derived as a result of a decedent's
services is, in the hands of decedent's successor, income in respect
of a decedent.3 5
The partnership sections of the Code define the payments by a
partnership to a deceased partner's successor that will be treated as in-
32 E.g., Midland Nat'1 Bank of Billings v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 736 (D. Mont.
1959); Ralph R. Huesman, 16 T.C. 656 (1951), aff'd on other grounds, 198 F.2d 133 (9th
Cir. 1952); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.691(a)-l(b)(1), (2) (1965); Rev. Rul. 64-150, 1964-1 Cum. BULL.
(Part 1) 448.
33 E.g., Miller v. United States, 389 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1968); Findlay v. Commissioner,
332 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1964); Marian Essenfeld, 37 T.C. 117, 124 (1961), aff'd, 311
F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1962); Latendresse v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 577 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 830 (1957); Hansberry v. All, 68-1 USTC 9185 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Bernard v. United
States, 215 F. Supp. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Florence E. Carr, 37 T.C. 1173 (1962); Fred
Basch, 9 T.C. 627 (1947), acquiesced in, 1948-1 Cum. BULL. 1; Thomas F. Remington, 9
T.C. 99 (1947); Rev. Rul. 68-124, 1968-1 Cum. BULL. 44.
34 Bausch v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951); O'Daniel v. Commissioner,
173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949); I.T. 3840, 1947-1 Cum. BULL. 7. Such voluntary payments
would not be includible in the gross estate for estate tax purposes. See, e.g., Raymond W.
Albright, 42 T.C. 643 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 356 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1966); William
E. Barr, 40 T.C. 227 (1963), acquiesced in, 1964-1 CuM. BULL. (Part 1) 4. Thus § 691 in-
dudes payments excludible from the coverage of § 2033. Nevertheless, several decisions
have stated that the § 691(c) deduction for the estate tax attributable to items of income
in respect of a decedent implies that such items are includible in the gross estate. See
United States v. Ellis, 264 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1959); Riegelman v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d
315 (2d Cir. 1958); Arthur H. Hull, 38 T.C. 512, 522 &c n.5 (1962), rev'd on other grounds,
325 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1963), acquiesced in, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 6; Rev. Rul. 66-20, 1966-1
Cum. BULL. 214. Exclusion from the gross estate because there is no inheritable interest
under § 2033 means there is neither a § 1014(a) fair market value basis nor an estate tax
paid with respect to the item. Therefore, the application of § 691(a) merely applies
§ 61(a)(14) to the exclusion of § 102(a).
35 E.g., O'Daniel v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949):
.It seems apparent from what we have already said that "the right . . . acquired
by the decedent's estate from the decedent" which is referred to in Section 126
(a)(1)(A) is not necessarily a legally enforceable right but merely any right derived.
through his services rendered while living.
Id. at 968.
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come in respect of a decedent.8 6 Concerning rights to income from
personal services, the judicial definition of "income in respect of a
decedent" under section 691 is extended by the partnership statutory
definition to include any right to payment for "services rendered or
to be rendered."37
A few special situations involving compensation deserve discus-
sion. Where an employee during life gratuitously transfers his right
to deferred compensation, the value of such right will sometimes be
includible in the deceased employee's gross estate.88 In such cases the
assignee's contract right will probably receive a section 1014(c) dece-
dent's basis rather than a section 1014(a) fair market value basis. The
assignee's right to income for services rendered by decedent is income
in respect of a decedent if the assignee is a "person who, by reason
of the death of the decedent, acquire[d] the right to receive the
amount."39 Although the assignee acquired his right to the deferred
compensation while decedent was alive, the Ninth Circuit ih another
30 Section 753 provides that § 736(a) payments to the successor in interest of a de-
ceased partner are income in respect of a decedent. Section 736(b)(2)(A) provides that pay-
ments for unrealized receivables, defined in § 751(c), are § 736(a) payments. The value of
§ 736(a) payments to a deceased partner's successor is indudible in the deceased partner's
gross estate. See, e.g., Riegelman v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1958); Arthur H.
Hull, 38 T.C. 512 (1962), acquiesced in, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 6, rev'd on other grounds, 325
F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1963); Rev. Rul. 66-20, 1966-1 Cuma. BuLL. 214. Concerning the acquisi-
tion of a § 1014(a) basis for that part of the value of a deceased partner's partnership
interest attributable to § 736(a) payments, see note 98 infra.
87 § 751(c)(2). See, e.g., United States v. Woolsey, 326 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1963) (man-
agement contract representing the right to receive future income is an unrealized re-
ceivable). Proposed § 776(c)(4)(B) of H.R. 9662 defined "unrealized receivables" as unre-
ported rights to payments for services rendered. H.R. REP,. No. 1231, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 158 (1960).
In 1954 the American Law Institute proposed a definition of "income in respect of
a decedent" which included "[a] right to a payment attributable to personal services"
explaining that "it is not thought that the death basis provisions will be seriously under-
mined by bringing under the purview of [section 691] . . . rights derived from personal
services, even though not accruable," because "personal service income unlike appreciation
in the value of property cannot properly claim the exempting benefits of section
[1014(a)]. . .. " 2 ALI FDm. INCOME TAx STAT. § X890(a)(5)(A), 151, 470-71 (Feb. 1954
Draft). See also Holland, supra note 19, at 369. In 1958 the Subchapter J Advisory
Group's proposed definition of "income in respect of a decedent" included "an amount
• . . which represents compensation for services rendered by the decedent." This pro-
posed elimination of any possible requirement that even a contingent right to the pay-
ment exist is consistent with present case law, and is explained by the statement that
"[t]his rule is designed to carry out the general policy of the Code that earned income
should not escape taxation." FINAL REPORT OF SUBCttTER J ArveiSORY GROUP, supra note
20, at 327-28; XVI ABA SECTION OF TAXATION BuLL. 182, 193 (1963).
88 Inclusion in the gross estate will result if the transfer was in contemplation of
death. § 2035.
39 § 691(a)(1)(B).
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context has held that section 1014(b), which provides that certain
property interests shall for purposes of section 1014(a) "be considered
to have been acquired from... the decedent," 40 makes the same prop-
erty interests, if otherwise described in section 691, income in respect
of a decedent for purposes of section 1014(a).41
Distributions from qualified employee benefit plans to a deceased
employee's successors are income in respect of a decedent.42 Section
691 classification in conjunction with section 1014(c) prevents the
value of such payment includible in decedent's gross estate43 from
acquiring a section 1014(a) fair market value basis. Where a qualified
trust distributes securities of the employer corporation to the em-
ployee, or after his death to his successor, in a distribution qualifying
for capital gains treatment 4 the difference between the value of the
securities distributed and their basis to the trust is excluded from the
40 Regulation § 1.1014-2(b)(2) states that § 1014(b)(9) covers generally all property
acquired from a decedent which is includible in the decedent's gross estate, including
property transferred by gift in contemplation of death.
41 Stanley v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1964), held that a surviving
spouse's one-half community property interest in installment obligations did not receive
a stepped-up basis under § 1014(b)(6) because § 1014(b)(6)'s rule that a surviving
spouse's one-half share of community property held by the decedent and the surviving
spouse "shall be considered to have been acquired from ... the decedent" makes such
property income in respect of a decedent under § 691. Section 1014(c) in turn applies to
all items of the type described in § 691 and falling within any category of § 1014(b).
42 Hess v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1959); Rev. Rul. 69-297, 1969 INT. REv.
BULL. No. 23, at 12; Rev. Rul. 68-506, 1968 INT. Rav. BULL. No. 38, at 18; Rev. Rul. 54-
601, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 197. In taxing distributions from qualified plans § 402 makes no
distinction between an employee and his successor in interest.
43 Section 2039(c) provides that the value of payments received by any beneficiary
(other than the executor) of a deceased employee under a qualified plan is excluded from
the employee's gross estate except to the extent that payments are attributable to the
decedent's contributions. Revenue ruling 56-1, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 444, ruled that for
purposes of § 2039(c) earnings attributable to the employee's contribution are considered
part of the employee's contribution. Revenue ruling 67-278, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 323, ruled
that the value of a deceased spouse's vested community property interest in a qualified plan
is includible in her gross estate under § 2033 and that § 2039(c) is inapplicable to exclude
such interest where the deceased spouse was not an employee-participant in the qualified
plan.
44 § 402(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § lA02(a)-l(a)(6) (1966). Section 691(a)(3)'s prescription
that "the amount includible in gross income under . . . [§§ 691(a)] (1) or (2) shall be
considered in the hands of the estate or such person to have the character which it
would have had in the hands of the decedent if the decedent had lived and received
such amount" creates a semantic problem where a distribution qualifies for capital gains
treatment under § 402(a)(2) because paid on account of the employee's death. Revenue
ruling 69-297, 1969 INT. REV. BULL. No. 23, at 12, however, held that a § 402(a)(2) distribu-
tion to a deceased employee's estate was reportable as income in respect of a decedent
and as long-term capital gain.
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distributee's income.45 The untaxed appreciation in value of the secu-
rities from their purchase until their distribution, referred to as net
unrealized appreciation, is not included in the basis of the securities
in the hands of the distributee.46 Securities distributed to the employee
and retained until death will be subject to an estate tax at their then
value and will presumably receive a section 1014(a) fair market value
basis, thereby eliminating any income tax on appreciation of the secu-
rities between acquisition by the trust and the employee's death.47
The acquisition of a section 1014(a) fair market value basis is un-
certain, however, because in a situation where the securities were
distributed to a deceased employee's successor, the Internal Revenue
Service ruled that the unrealized appreciation would be includible
in gross income when the securities were disposed of in a taxable
transaction and that the transferor would be allowed a section 691(c)
deduction.48 By implication such securities, perhaps unlike securities
distributed to the employee, cannot obtain a section 1014(a) fair mar-
ket value basis upon inclusion in a distributee's gross estate since the
net unrealized appreciation excluded from income upon distribution
to the employee's successor is income in respect of a decedent.
Property (other than options to purchase property) received as
compensation for services subject to a restriction that has a significant
effect on its value is taxable when the restriction lapses or when the
property is sold, whichever occurs earlier.49 The amount of compen-
sation is the lesser of the unrestricted value of the property when
received or either the value of the property when the restriction lapses
or the consideration received upon the sale, whichever is applicable. 50
Apparently, where a taxpayer dies before realizing compensation in-
45 § 402(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1A02(a)-l(b)(1) (1966). Unrealized appreciation on em-
ployer securities to the extent attributable to contributions by the employee is not taxed
at the time of distribution regardless of the time or form of the distribution. § 402(a)(1).
Revenue ruling 69-297, 1969 INT. REv. BULL. No. 23, at 12, ruled that the exclusion from
income applies to a distribution to a deceased employee's estate. See also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.691(a)-1(d) (1960).
46 § 402(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1A02(a)-l(b)(1)(i) (1966).
47 C. HAVIGHUIsr, DEFERRED COMPENSATION FOR KEY EMPLOYEES 75, 333 (1964);
H. SELLIN, TAXATION OF DEFERRED EMPLOYEE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 369 (1960).
48 Rev. Rul. 69-297, 1969 INT. REV. BULL. No. 23, at 12. The § 691(c) income tax
deduction applies to § 691(a) items. The reference in revenue ruling 69-297 to "a taxable
transaction" is confusing because § 691(a)(2) specifically defines taxable transfers of a
right to receive income in respect of a decedent.
49 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(5) (1966); id. § 1.421-6(d)(2) (1966); Rev. Rul. 68-86, 1968-1
Cum. BuL. 184.
50 Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d)(2)(i) (1966).
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come in connection with restricted property, the Internal Revenue
Service treats the restricted property as income in respect of a decedent
so that decedent's successors realize compensation income in the same
manner that the decedent would have.5'
The partnership regulations provide that transfers of partner-
ship capital as compensation for services constitute ordinary income
to the recipient.52 The amount of compensation is the fair market value
of the interest in capital transferred, "either at the time the transfer
is made for past services, or at the time the services have been rendered
where the transfer is conditioned on the completion of the transferee's
future services."r5 3 The regulations provide that the time when such
income is realized depends on "all the facts and circumstances, in-
cluding any substantial restrictions or conditions on the compensated
partner's right to withdraw or otherwise dispose of such interest."'5
A restricted partnership interest is taxable when the restriction lapses
or the property is disposed of, whichever event first occurs. 55
The partnership regulations also provide:
To the extent that an interest in capital representing compensation
for services rendered by the decedent prior to his death is trans-
ferred after his death to the decedent's successor in interest, the
51 Regulation § 1.61-2(d)(5) applies only the rules of regulation § 1.421-6(d)(2) to
restricted property. Regulation § 1.61-15 applies all of regulation § 1.421-6, including
§ 1.421-6(d)(5), to compensatory nonstatutory options to purchase property. Regulation
§ 1A21-6(d)(5) provides that where such optionee dies without realizing compensation his
successors will realize compensation in the same manner as he would have. It is reported
that the Internal Revenue Service applies a similar rule to restricted property except
that a successor realizes compensation income in the amount of the lesser of the unre-
stricted value of the property when acquired, the value when the restriction lapses, or the
value on the date of death. See Rothschild & Sawen, The 'Restricted Stock' Plan Arrange-
ment: A Practical Analysis of Its Current Use, 28 J. TAXATION 328, 329 (1968); Rustigan,
A Deferred Income Plan for the Corporate Executive, 54 A.B.A.J. 506, 508 (1968).
52 Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1960).
53 Id. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1960). Presumably the rule of regulation § 1.421-6(d)(2) (com-
pensation equals the lesser value at acquisition or value when restrictions lapse) does
not apply. See note 55 infra.
54 Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1960). Regulation § 1.421-6(d)(2)(ii), applicable by rea-
son of regulation § 1.61-2(d)(5), offers several examples of restrictions having a significant
effect on value.
55 Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d)(2)(i) (1966), applicable by reason of regulation § 1.61-2(d)(5)
(1966). Proposed regulation § 1.721-1(b) stated that the value of the interest in partnership
capital acquired as compensation for services
is taxable to such partner at such time as there are no substantial restrictions
or conditions on his right to withdraw or otherwise dispose of such amount,
or when in fact he does obtain such amount (either through a distribution or
by sale or exchange of his partnership interest), whichever event first occurs.
20 Fed. Reg. 5866 (1955).
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fair market value of such interest is income in respect of a dece-
dent under section 691.56
If a restricted interest in partnership capital is transferred to a service
partner before death and passes to the service partner's successor at
his death without having been taxed, it is unclear whether the prop-
erty is an item of income in respect of a decedent in the hands of the
deceased partner's successor in interest.57 The treatment of crops and
livestock received by a farm landlord as share rents, which pass on
death to his successor in interest as income in respect of a decedent
because the items represent rent earned but not reported prior to
death, indicates the correct treatment for the unreported compensation
in employer securities and a restricted interest in partnership capital
received by an employee or service partner before death. 8
Nonstatutory stock options received as compensation represent
taxable income upon receipt if the option has a readily ascertainable
fair market value.59 If the option does not have a readily ascertain-
able fair market value at the time it is granted, as is usually the case,
the grantee realizes income when he transfers the option,60 or upon
exercises1 unless the option property is subject to a restriction which
has a significant effect on its value. In this case the grantee realizes
income when the restriction lapses or the property is sold, whichever
event first occurs. 62 Where the optionee dies before realizing income
56 Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1960).
57 Willis, in his Handbook of Partnership Taxation at 60 (1957), states that an untaxed
restricted interest in partnership capital transferred to the service partner prior to his
death is an item of income in respect of a decedent. Cf. Herman M. Hale, 24 T.C.M.
1497, 1509-11 (1965), holding the value of a partnership interest acquired in return for
services an unrealized receivable under § 751(c)(2).
Proposed § 770(c)(1)(B) of H.R. 9662 would have taxed a deceased partner's successor
when the restrictions lapsed or upon transfer of the interest other than by death. Where
the restrictions terminated upon death, the amount of compensation (the smaller of the
value of the services or the unrestricted value of the partnership interest at the time of
the exchange) would have been includible in the decedent's final income tax return.
H.R. REP. No. 1231, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 93-95, 156 (1960).
58 Davis v. United States, 68-2 USTC 9483 (S.D. Ill. 1968); Davison v. United
States, 292 F.2d 937 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Rev. Rul. 64-289, 1964-2
Cuns. BULL. 173; Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958-2 CuMr. BULL. 366. Cf. Tatum v. United States, 400
F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1968).
59 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-15 (1968); id. § 1.421-6(c)(1) (1966). The amount of compensa-
tion is the excess of the value of the option over the amount paid for it. Regulations
§§ 1.421-6(c)(2), (3) define "readily ascertainable fair market value." See also id. § 1.421-
7(b)(1).
60 Id. § 1.421-6(d)(3) (1966). The amount of compensation is the gain resulting from
the transfer.
61 Id. § 1.421-6(d)(1) (1966). The amount of compensation is the excess of the value
of the property over the amount paid for it.
02 Id. § 1.421-6(d)(2)(i) (1966). The amount of compensation is the lesser of (a) the ex-
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in connection with a nonstatutory stock option, the rules governing
income in respect of a decedent apply so that the deceased optionee's
successors will realize compensation income in the same manner that
the decedent would have. 63
The exercise of a qualified stock option granted at an option
price less than the fair market value of the stock subject to the option
on the date of grant may result in the realization of ordinary income
at the time of exercise under section 422(c)(1). 64 An unexercised qual-
ified stock option is, in the hands of a deceased optionee's successors
in interest, property which constitutes a right to receive an item of
income in respect of a decedent.6" Where a qualified stock option is
exercised by the deceased optionee's successors in interest any amount
includible in income under section 422(c)(1) is considered income in
respect of a decedent.66
The disposition of stock acquired by the exercise of an option
granted under an employee stock purchase plan at less than the fair
market value of the stock subject to the option on the date of grant
may also result in the realization of ordinary income.6 7 Realization
of ordinary income is caused by a disposition of the stock or the death
of the owner of the stock acquired under the option.68 An unexercised
option issued under an employee stock purchase plan is, in the hands
of a deceased optionee's successors in interest, property which consti-
cess of the unrestricted value of the property when acquired over the amount paid for it
or (b) either the excess of the value of the property when the restriction lapses over the
amount paid for it or the excess of the consideration received upon a sale of the property
over the amount paid for it.
63 Id. § 1.421-6(d)(5) (1966). There is one exception. If the option has been exercised
by the employee before his death but no income has been realized because the option
property was acquired subject to a restriction, and if such restriction is removed as a
consequence of the employee's death, compensation income will be considered to have
been realized by such employee in the taxable year ending with his death. Id. § 1.421-6
(d)(2)(ii), example (2) (1966).
64 Under § 422(c)(1) the person exercising the option includes as compensation in the
year the option is exercised an amount equal to the lesser of (1) 150% of the difference
between the option price and the fair market value of the stock at the time the option
was granted; or (2) the difference between the option price and the fair market value of
the shares at the time of exercise of the option.
65 Treas. Reg. § 1.421-8(c)(4)(iii) (1966).
66 § 421(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.421-8(c)(3)(i) (1966).
67 Under § 423(c) the amount of ordinary income is the amount by which the option
price is exceeded by the lesser of (1) the fair market value of the stock at the time of
disposition or death, or (2) the fair market value of the stock at the time the option
was granted.
68 § 423(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.423-2(k) (1966). Thus if an optionee exercises a stock op-
tion issued under an employee stock purchase plan and owns the stock at his death any
compensation income is includible in his final income tax return.
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tutes a right to receive an item of income in respect of a decedent. 69
Where the deceased optionee's successors in interest exercise an option
issued under an employee stock purchase plan, there is no income
tax consequence until a disposition of the stock occurs.70 Upon a dis-
position of the stock the difference between the option price and the
value of the stock when the option was granted is treated as income
in respect of a decedent.71
RIGHTS TO INCOME FROM COMPLETED SALES
Rights to payments under installment obligations72 and any
unreported income inherent in other rights to payment received upon
a sale or exchange of property completed during decedent's life are
income in respect of a decedent in the hands of decedent's successors
in interest.7 3 Reference to an exclusive accrual accounting test has
been rejected and, consistent with the treatment of rights to payments
for decedent's services, rights to payments for sales completed by dece-
dent represent income in respect of a decedent whether or not ac-
69 Treas. Reg. § 1.421-8(c)(4)(iii) (1966).
70 § 421(c); § 423(c).
71 Treas. Reg. § 1.421-8(c)(3)(i) (1966).
72 Section 691(a)(4) defines "income in respect of a decedent" to include the excess of
the face amount of an installment obligation over the decedent's basis therefor.
73 Where during decedent's life the sale was considered closed for income tax pur-
poses and gain was recognized, any income received in excess of decedent's basis (the
value of the obligations received) less pre-death collections is income in respect of a
decedent. See Wilcox v.'United States, 185 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Ohio 1960); Abraham Gold-
stein, 33 T.C. 1032 (1960), acquiesced in, 1960-2 Cum. BuLL. 5.
To the contrary is Grill v. United States, 303 F.2d 922 (Ct. Cl. 1962), where decedent,
who died in 1944, owned a right to payments based on net profits under a movie distribu-
tion contract received in the liquidation of a corporation in 1942. The liquidation was
treated as closed for income tax purposes and decedent recognized gain in 1942. At
decedents death in 1944 the right to payments acquired a § 1014(a) fair market value basis
without dispute, and after subsequently recovering this basis the decedent's successors
reported payments received in 1950 as capital gain arguing that the 1942 liquidation was
an open transaction and that the right to payments was property which constituted a
right to receive income in respect of a decedent. The court held that the 1942 corporate
liquidation was a closed transaction, thus establishing the character of the payments, and
that in any event the payments were not income in respect of a decedent because at-
tributable to rentals earned after death.
Where during decedent's life the sale was considered open for income tax purposes
and gain was not recognized, because of the nature of the obligation received, the dece-
dent's accounting method, or both, the rights to payments are also rights to income in re-
spect of a decedent. See Dixon v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. Ky. 1950), aff'd per
curiam, 192 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1951); Stephen H. Dorsey, 49 T.C. 606, 632-33 (1968); John
A. Biewer, 41 T.C. 191 (1963), aff'd, 341 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1965); Rev. Rul. 57-544, 1957-2
Cum. BuLL. 361, as amplified by Rev. Rul. 60-227, 1960-1 Cum. BuL. 262.
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cruable at decedent's death and regardless of the nature of the asset
sold.74
RIGHTS TO INCOME UNDER EXECUTORY SALES CONTRACTS
Inherited assets subject to executory sales contracts are property
which constitutes a right to receive an item of income in respect of
a decedent except where the sales contract specifies that the sale is to
occur only after decedent's death.7 5 The decisions stress two criteria
for resolving the section 691 classification issue: decedent's possession
of a right to the proceeds and the relationship between decedent's
activities and the receipt of the proceeds.
In Commissioner v. Linde76 the decedent, a grape grower, had
delivered grapes to a co-operative marketing association which pro-
cessed them into wine to be sold by the co-operative. Under decedent's
marketing contract the co-operative was an agent; decedent retained
title until the co-operative sold the wine, at which time he received
payment. Sale of the wine occurred after decedent's death. Rejecting
as irrelevant the lack of a sale before decedent's death, the Ninth
Circuit held that the payments to decedent's successor were income
in respect of a decedent because the income was the product of dece-
dent's efforts and contracts.77 As authority for its classification of the
74 The proposed ALl definition of "income in respect of a decedent" included all
rights to payments under installment obligations and accruable rights to payments from
sales prior to decedent's death of stock in trade, property held for sale in the ordinary
course of business, or rights to income. Excluded were nonaccruable rights to payments
from sales prior to decedent's death and accruable rights to payments from sales prior to
decedent's death of capital assets or noncapital assets other than stock in trade or rights
to income. 2 ALI FED. INCOME TAX STAT. § X890(a)(5), 151 (Feb. 1954 Draft).
The proposed Subchapter J Advisory Group definition of "income in respect of a
decedent" rejected reference to accrual accounting, asset classification, and completion of
the sale before death. Included as income in respect of a decedent were "proceeds of a
sale, exchange, or other disposition of property made prior to the death of the decedent,"
the excess of the face amount of an installment obligation over the decedent's basis
therefor, and amounts "which would have been taxable to the decedent if he had lived to
receive it ... and which he failed to receive solely by reason of his death, to the extent
that the value of the right to receive such amount is includible in the gross estate for
Federal estate tax purposes." FINAL REPORT OF SUBCAPxER J ADVIsoRY GROUP, supra note
20, at 323-24. See XVI ABA SErION OF TAXATiON BuLL. 182 (1963).
75 Because of this rule a successor in interest to an asset encumbered by an executory
sales contract will be motivated to break the contract and independently dispose of the
asset in order to obtain a § 1014(a) fair market value basis instead of a § 1014(c) de-
cedent's basis for purposes of determining gain upon the sale. See Note, Tax Effect of
Executor's Rescission and Renegotiation of Decedent's Contracts, 51 MINN. L. REv. 251
(1966).
76 213 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 871 (1954).
77 Id. at 3-4. Cf. Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 366, 368, modified, Rev. Rul.
64-289, 1964-2 Cum. BuLL. 173.
INCOME IN RESPECT OF A DECEDENT
payments as income in respect of a decedent despite the absence of
an unconditional right to the payments at the date of decedent's death,
the court cited O'Daniel v. Commissioner,78 in which the Second Cir-
cuit held that voluntary payments by a former employer to a deceased
employee's estate were income in respect of a decedent although the
employer was not obliged to pay anything.
The Fifth Circuit held in Trust Co. of Georgia v. Ross79 that
where at death decedent owns stock subject to an executory sales con-
tract, the sales proceeds, received upon consummation of the contract
by his .executor, are income in respect of a decedent. The court viewed
the contract as creating a right to the sales proceeds which was not
destroyed by the requirement that the executor perform certain closing
conditions in order to perfect such right. Unlike the Ninth Circuit
in Linde, the court specifically subordinated the requirement of a
causal relationship between decedent's activities and receipt of the
income to the requirement that a right to the income, albeit subject
to conditions, exist at decedent's death: "Absent such a right, no matter
how great the activities or efforts, there would be no taxable income
under § 691."80
Finally, in George C. Keck8l decedent owned minority stock in-
terests in corporations that had contracted to sell their assets. After
taxpayer's death and the completion of certain closing conditions,
the corporations sold their assets and were liquidated by their share-
holders. The Tax Court held that the liquidation proceeds received
by decedent's successor were income in respect of a decedent because
attributable to the decedent's economic activities. Although no formal
action had been taken before decedent's death to liquidate the corpo-
rations, the Tax Court found "that the liquidation of the three sell-
ing corporations .. after the sale of the assets was carried out was an
78 178 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949).
79 392 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968).
80 Id. at 695. Before taxpayer's death, the stock and $500,000 of the purchase price
were placed in escrow with the latter amount to be liquidated damages if the buyer de-
faulted. After taxpayer's death, his executor performed certain acts in connection with
closing the sales contract including altering the contract to provide for a cash and credit
sale instead of a cash sale. Taxpayers argued unsuccessfully that the executor's activities
demonstrated that the decedent had no right to the sales proceeds and that the sale was
not made solely as the result of efforts of the decedent during his lifetime. The govern-
ment argued that if an estate by changing the time or amount of payment could remove
the sales proceeds from § 691 coverage by making the income no longer primarily the
product of decedent's agreements, there would be no § 691 income; an estate would
simply reduce the contract price by some amount less than the tax due on the income
if treated as income in respect of a decedent. Brief for Appellee at 88 & n.17, Trust Co.
of Ga. v. Ross, 392 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1967).
81 49 T.C. 313 (1968), rev'd, 415 F.2d 581, 69-2 USTC 9626 (6th Cir. 1969).
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integral part of the original plan to sell such corporate assets" and was
merely "the outgrowth of the ... contract of sale and other arrange-
ments entered into by decedent prior to his death."8 2 Crucial to this
finding was the provision in the sale contract providing for its nulli-
fication in the event the companies were unable to secure a ruling
that a sale and subsequent liquidation would make the sale nontax-
able under section 337.83 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit explicitly
adopted the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Trust Co. of Georgia v. Ross
that there can be no income in respect of a decedent unless decedent
possessed a right to the income. Applying this rule the Sixth Circuit
reversed the Tax Court on the ground that "at the date of his death,
decedent ... possessed neither the right nor the power to require the
corporations to liquidate and did not, prior to his death, possess the
right to receive any proceeds from the contemplated liquidation."8 4
Since the contract to sell the corporations' assets was as binding
as the parties could make it,5 the court must have considered the
performance of the routine acts required to liquidate the corporations
as prerequisite to applying section 691. This result virtually imposes
a requirement that there exist an unqualified right to the income,
an interpretation of section 691 inconsistent with O'Daniel v. Com-
missioner, where no right to the income existed; with Commissioner
v. Linde, where an unqualified right to the income awaited the pro-
cessing of the grapes and the sale of wine; and with Trust Co. of
82 Id. at 320-21. Taxpayer offered evidence of the executor's economic activities as
proof that decedent had no right to the liquidation proceeds and to attenuate the causal
relationship between decedent's economic activities and receipt of the liquidation pro-
ceeds. Six dissenters said that while the corporations had a contingent right to the sales
proceeds, the decedent, in the absence of any contract to liquidate the corporations, had
no right to the liquidation proceeds. Id. at 328-24.
83 Id. at 820. Section 887(a) provides that if a corporation adopts a plan of complete
liquidation and distributes all of its assets in complete liquidation within the 12-month
period beginning on the date of the adoption of the plan, it shall not recognize gain or
loss from the sale or exchange of property within the 12-month period. Clearly distin-
guishable from Keck is Boyle v. United States, 855 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1965), where the
decedent owned all of the stock of a corporation which owned preferred stock of another
corporation with accumulated dividend arrearages. After taxpayer's death, his successors
liquidated the corporation and received the preferred stock. The accumulated dividend
arrearages were not income in respect of a decedent where prior to decedent's death there
was no plan to liquidate.
84 Keck v. Commissioner, 415 F.2d 581, 585, 69-2 USTO 9626, at 85,691 (6th Cir.
1969).
85 At decedent's death the corporations' executory sales contracts were contingent on
approval of the sales by the Interstate Commerce Commission. This condition, while re-
cited in the sale contract, was a requirement imposed by federal law. Brief for Respondent
at 25 9= n.9, Keck v. Commissioner, 415 F.2d 531, 69-2 USTC 9626 (6th Cir. 1969).
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Georgia v. Ross, where an unqualified right to the income awaited
the performance by the estate of certain conditions required to con-
summate the sales contract. In fact, the formal prerequisites to liq-
uidation in Keck were substantially equivalent to the acts performable
by the estate in Trust Co. of Georgia v. Ross, which were held insuf-
ficient to vitiate decedent's right to the income. However, since the Sixth
Circuit accepted the holding of Trust Co. of Georgia v. Ross that in-
come in respect of a decedent is not limited to money owed for property
sold before death, its Keck decision appears to represent only a factual
judgment of the significance of the conditions to the decedent's right
to income at the date of death. Nevertheless, Keck establishes for pur-
poses of section 691 a questionable distinction between an executory
sale of stock and an interdependent executory asset sale and liquida-
tion under section 337.
In the case of personal service income the relationship between
the decedent's lifetime activities and the payment is easily established.
Even a voluntary posthumous payment for decedent's lifetime ser-
vices must be regarded as resulting solely from decedent's activities.
Accordingly, the Second Circuit in O'Daniel v. Commissioner86 clas-
sified a voluntary payment by a former employer to a deceased em-
ployee's estate as income in respect of a decedent, holding that the
right to the income existing at the decedent's death need not be legally
enforceable so long as it derives from services rendered by the dece-
dent. But where gain on a transfer of appreciated property is involved,
the income can be primarily the product of either pre-death efforts
of the decedent or the post-death efforts of his successors. There must,
therefore, be a factual determination of whose efforts are primarily
responsible. The difficulty of this determination and the need for a
workable minimum standard of when income can be primarily the
product of decedent's pre-death activities probably explains the re-
quirement of the Ross and Keck courts that gain on a posthumous
sale cannot be income in respect of a decedent unless decedent's
activities gave rise to at least a conditional right to the income. In
effect this requirement rejects as insufficient any decedent's activities
that fail to produce a conditional right to the income. Because of this
requirement, the executory contract holdings will not be extended
to cover options to buy or offers to sell that are exercised or accepted
after the death of the owner of the property subject to such option
or offer.87 The sales proceeds in such a case may be attributable to
86 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949).
87 The government has argued that the sales proceeds in such a case are income in
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economic activities and agreements of the decedent and not his suc-
cessor, but those activities are considered insufficient unless decedent
possessed at least a conditional right to the income.88
Concerning partnerships, the statutory definition of income in
respect of a decedent, as supplemented by the regulations, includes
contractual rights "to payment for ... goods delivered, or to be deliv-
ered, to the extent the proceeds therefrom would be treated as amounts
received from the sale or exchange of property other than a capital
asset."8 9 Consistent with the cases applying section 691 to rights to
respect of a decedent because the absence, at decedent's death, of an unconditional right
on decedent's part to receive the sales proceeds or of any certainty that they will actually be
received is no barrier to inclusion under § 691 if, when they are received, they are
dearly the result of the economic agreements of the decedent, and not of the executor.
Brief for Appellee at 33-34, Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ross, 392 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1967); Brief
for Respondent at 16, George C. Keck, 49 T.C. 313 (1968); Brief for Respondent at 21,
Keck v. Commissioner, 415 F.2d 531, 69-2 USTC 9626 (6th Cir. 1969). Compare Voegelin,
(Ise of Options In Tax Planning, 17 U. So. CAL. 1965 TAX INST. 729, 769-70, where a
§ 1014(a) fair market value basis for property subject to an executory option to sell is
assumed.
On the other hand, options to produce a play or motion picture do receive a § 1014(a)
fair market value basis. Gabriel Pascal, 22 T.C.M. 1766 (1963). Presumably contracts
to buy, unlike contracts to sell, obtain a § 1014(a) fair market value basis and not a
§ 1014(c) decedent's basis upon inclusion in the gross estate. Regulation § 1.1014-3(c)
is probably not intended to apply to decedents' contracts to buy; if it were it would
amount to an application of § 1014(c) by denying a basis equal to the fair market value
of the contract to buy under § 1014(a) plus the purchase price. Cf. Rev. Rul. 67-96, 1967-1
Cum. BuLL. 195.
88 See Cummer v. United States, 62-1 USTC 9844 (S.D. Cal. 1962), which involved
a sale of land to a municipal corporation. Pursuant to escrow instructions contained in
the sales contract the land was divided into three parcels and a deed to each parcel was
deposited in escrow. The purchase price payments for each parcel were due in 1956, 1957,
and 1958, respectively, and the buyer was to receive each deed upon payment therefor.
Payments and deed transfers occurred in 1956 and 1957, the seller died on April 15, 1957,
and his executor received the final payment and transferred the final deed on January 81,
1958. The court, without discussing § 691, held that the sales contract was void because
it violated the California constitution, the transfers constituted three independent sales,
and the seller's estate was entitled to a § 1014(a) fair market value basis for the unsold
parcel. Cf. C. William Meinecke, 47 B.T.A. 634 (1942), acquiesced in, 1942-2 CuM. BULL.
13, dealing with a similar situation under the pre-1942 statute, § 42, which required in-
clusion in a taxpayer's final return of all "amounts accrued up to the date of his death."
89 § 751(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(c)(1) (1965); § 736(b)(2)(A); § 753. See, e.g., Her-
man Glazer, 44 T.C. 541 (1965) (alternative holding). Proposed § 776(c)(4)(A) of H.R. 9662
defined "unrealized receivables" as unreported rights
to payments for . .. goods produced (or delivered, in the case of a partnership
predominantly engaged in a distributing trade or business), to the extent that the
proceeds therefrom would be treated as amounts received from the sale or ex-
change of property other than a capital asset.
H.R. Rm. No. 1231, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1960). The Report explained how this
definition of income in respect of a decedent limited the existing definition in § 751(c)(1).
In the case of goods, those not yet delivered, where a partnership is predom-
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payments under executory contracts to sell and from completed sales
of noncapital assets by individuals, rights to payments under executory
contracts to sell and from completed sales of noncapital assets by
partnerships are income in respect of a decedent. Inconsistent with
the cases applying section 691 to rights to payments under executory
contracts to sell and from completed sales of capital assets by indi-
viduals, rights to payments under executory contracts to sell and from
completed sales of capital assets by partnerships are not income in
respect of a decedent. Evidently, to avoid income in respect of a dece-
dent treatment for posthumous payments, sales of capital assets for
deferred payments where recognition of gain is deferred should be
made by partnerships, not by individuals. And even an individual who
sells a capital asset on the installment basis may be able to avoid
section 691 by transferring the installment obligation to a partner-
ship.90
RIGHTS TO INCOME UNDER EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
TO SELL AFTER DEATH
The regulations provide that where the decedent leaves property
subject to an executory contract to sell after his death, such property
is not a right to receive income in respect of a decedent and section
1014(a) applies to the property. This rule is said to follow from the
fact that a sale effective only in the event of death is a sale consum-
mated after death.91 Why property encumbered by a contract pro-
inantly in a distributing trade or business . . . are omitted. For manufacturing
and similar types of business, the term includes goods produced, but not yet
delivered, where orders have been placed at the time of the withdrawal from
the partnership of the deceased ... partner.
Id. at 35.
90 § 731(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.453-9(c)(2) (1965); id. § 1.721-1(a) (1960). The installment
obligation is not an unrealized receivable as defined in § 751(c). Concerning gain or loss
to the partnership upon a posthumous distribution of the installment obligation, see
Wum~s, supra note 57, at 289.
91 Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b), example (4) (1960), adopted by T.D. 6257, 1957-2 Cum.
ButL. 342, 345-46. The committee Reports on the Revenue Act of 1942 contained one
ambiguous example apropos of the intended application of § 126 to executory contracts
to sell property on death.
An example of the application of this provision . . . is the case of a partner
who contracts in the partnership agreement that his interest in certain partner-
ship assets shall pass to the surviving partners in exchange for payments to be
made by them to his widow. On his death, the payments by the surviving part-
ners shall be included in the widow's income to the extent they represent the
gain on such sale.
H.R. RaP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 101 (1942). The same example was carried over into the original regulations which,
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viding for a sale by taxpayer if he lives and by his executor if he dies
is a right to receive income in respect of a decedent, while property
encumbered by a contract for a sale by the executor alone is not, is
unclear. In each case the income is attributable to decedent's activ-
ities and agreements. In each case decedent possessed a conditional
right to the income and during his lifetime could have sued upon an
anticipatory breach of contract. The government has argued in support
of its regulation that a contract for a sale after death is exempt from
section 691 because that section is designed to cover situations in which
decedent intended to realize income during his lifetime and, but for
his death, would have done So. 9 2 Several decisions, however, have
applied section 691 to tax such income items as death benefits which
the decedent would not have received had he lived.93 So long as sec-
tion 691 taxes such death benefits received by decedent's successors,
its failure to reach sales proceeds received by decedent's successors
under contracts to sell at death cannot be explained on the basis that
the gain on the sale was not intended to be realized during life.94
however, elaborated on the meaning of "gain" by stating that the payments were in-
cluded in the widow's income "to the extent they exceeded the adjusted basis of such
assets in the hands of the decedent immediately, prior to his death." Treas. Reg. 103,
§ 19.126-1, as added by T.D. 5233, 1943-1 Cum. Buu... 198, 203-05. Thereafter, two rulings,
Special Ruling of November 10, 1944, signed by General Counsel Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr.
(5 P-H 1945 FED. TAx 76,080), and Special Ruling of April 13, 1945, signed by Acting
Commissioner George Schoeneman (5 P-H 1945 Fr. TAx 76,190), held that where de-
cedent's successor sells property pursuanit to decedent's executory contract to sell on his
death the excess of the sales proceeds over the adjusted basis to the decedent immediately
prior to his death is income in respect of a decedent.
In 1945 the regulations were amended to provide that property subject to an executory
contract to sell at death would receive a new basis upon taxpayer's death. T.D. 5459, 1945
CuM. BULL. 193, 194, amending Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.126-1 (1943). Subsequentl Special
Ruling of August 23, 1945, signed by Deputy Commissioner Norman D. Cann (5 P-H 1945
Fa. TAx 76,295), elaborated on the change in the regulations and concluded that a fair
market value basis attaches to property subject to a contract to sell only in the event of
death because such a sale is consummated after death. The example in the Special Ruling
of August 23, 1945, was carried over into the regulations issued under § 691.
92 Brief for Appellee at 27-28, Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ross, 392 F.2d 694 (5th Cir.
1967); Reply Brief for Respondent at 11-12, George C. Keck, 49 T.C. 313 (1968); Brief for
Respondent at 24 n.7, Keck v. Commissioner, 415 F.2d 531, 69-2 USTC 9626 (6th Cir.
1969).
93 Miller v. United States, 389 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1968); Marian Essenfeld, 37
T.C. 117, 124 (1961), aff'd, 311 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1962); Bausch v. Commissioner, 186
F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951); O'Daniel v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949); Hansberry
v. All, 68-1 USTC 9185 (N.D. II. 1967); Bernard v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 256
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). Contra, Lacomble v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
94 See Krieg & Buschmann, Section 126: "Items of Gross Income in Respect of a
Decedent . . .", 32 TAxE~s 651 (1954), where the authors argue that a right to payment
under a completed but unreported sale is as much entitled to an exemption from § 126
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Under the present rules, rights to payments under inter vivos
redemptions of stock or inter vivos installment redemptions, where
each installment is treated as an independent repurchase transaction,95
are income in respect of a decedent as rights arising under completed
or executory sales contracts, while rights to payments under contracts
to redeem only after death are not income in respect of a decedent.96
Payments from a partnership to a partner in liquidation of his
partnership interest are taxed the same, insofar as items of income
in respect of a decedent are concerned, whether the liquidation occurs
before or after death.97 Upon the death of a partner the partnership
interest obtains a basis equal to its fair market value, reduced however
by the value of decedent's interest in items of income in respect of
a decedent.98 These items are unrealized receivables, defined as un-
as an executory contract to sell at death. They ask, "[c]an an 'item' of income include
contingencies for salary purposes and yet exclude a binding, specific buy-and-sell con-
tract?" Id. at 653.
95 Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir.
1960); Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus Limitations, 79 H~Av. L. REv.
303, 304-05 (1965).
96 See text at notes 72-94 supra. Sections 302(a) and 303(a) provide that stock re-
demptions satisfying certain conditions are treated as exchanges. Stock inherited along
with an unexercised option to resell to the corporation presumably obtains a § 1014(a)
basis under regulation § 1.691(a)-2(b), example (4). Open end investment companies pro-
vide their shareholders with options to redeem. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 22(c),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (1964). See Note, Stock Redemption at the Option of the Shareholder
in the Close Corporation, 48 IowA L. REv. 986 (1963).
97 Section 756(b)(2)(A) provides that liquidating payments for unrealized receivables,
as defined in § 751(c), are § 736(a) payments. Section 753 provides that § 736(a) payments
to a deceased partner's successor in interest are income in respect of a decedent. Regula-
tion § 1.753-1(a) provides that "[w]hen a partner who is receiving payments under sec-
tion 736(a) dies, section 753 applies to any remaining payments under section 736(a) made
to his estate or other successor in interest."
98 Treas. Reg. § 1.742-1 (1960). This regulation, which prevents decedent's successor
in interest from realizing a loss equal to the amount of the § 736(a) payments, is ap-
parently without statutory basis. Section 742 refers to the general basis provisions for
computation of the basis of a partnership interest acquired by inheritance. The property
interest, which receives a new income tax basis under § 1014(a) upon the death" of a
partner, is the deceased partner's interest in the partnership, not his proportionate interests
in the various assets of the partnership. In fact, a § 754 election is required to apply
§ 743(b) to effect a new basis for the decedent's interest in each asset owned by the part-
nership. Nevertheless, regulation § 1.742-1 does not consider the partnership interest as a
unit but proceeds on an asset-by-asset approach in computing the successor's basis for its
interest in the partnership. Similarly, revenue ruling 66-325, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 249, provides
that where an adjustment in the basis of the partnership assets to reflect the change in
basis at the partner's level is made under § 743(b), the successor's § 1014(a) fair market
value basis for its partnership interest must be reduced to the extent it is attributable to
items representing income in respect of a decedent. Legislation has been suggested to
accomplish this result. Proposed § 203(c) of H.R. 9662, amending § 1014(c), H.R. REP.
No. 1251, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1960). See Wn.us, supra note 57, at 389-95; Swihart,
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reported rights to payment for services rendered or to be rendered,
or for goods delivered or to be delivered where the proceeds on their
disposition would produce ordinary income, and certain depreciation
subject to recapture. Unlike corporate stock redemptions, rights to
liquidating payments for a partnership interest are taxed the same,
insofar as items of income in respect of a decedent are concerned,
whether the rights to payments arise under an inter vivos liquidation,
an executory contract to liquidate during the partner's life but con-
summated after his death, or an executory contract to liquidate after
death.
RIGHTS TO INCOME UNDER EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
TO SELL IN TAX-FREE EXCHANGES
So long as the regulations provide that property subject to a con-
tract to sell after death is not a right to receive income in respect of
a decedent, property subject to a contract to sell in a tax-free exchange
during life but consummated after death should not be considered
a right to receive income in respect of a decedent. In neither case did
decedent intend to recognize income during his lifetime. In addition,
since property received upon consummation during decedent's life
of a tax-free exchange would receive a section 1014(a) fair market
value basis at decedent's death, application of section 691 to an exec-
utory contract to sell in a tax-free exchange would produce an anom-
alous result.9 Under section 1014(c), decedent's basis for the property
subject to the executory contract would become the substituted basis
for the property received upon consummation of the contract.100 If
section 691 should be held to apply to the contract, its consummation
should be tax-free under section 691(a)(3), despite section 691(a)(2),
which precludes the tax-free transfer of a right to receive income in
respect of a decedent.101
Tax Problems Raised by Liquidations of Partnership Interests, 44 TExAS L. Rv. 1209,
1223-24 (1966).
99 The various tax-free exchange sections of the Code are intended to result in
postponement, not forgiveness, of taxation, and this objective is accomplished through the
mechanism of a substituted basis. In theory the unrecognized gain will be taxed when
the new property is sold. If the new property is held until death the theory is breached
because the postponed gain is obliterated by § 1014(a), under which the heirs take the
property with a new basis equal to its value at the date of death. The result should not
change because the tax-free exchange is executory rather than consummated.
100 E.g., § 1031(d), § 1033(c), or § 358(a).
101 The tax-free transfer of a right to receive income in respect of a decedent repre-
sented by an asset subject to an executory sales contract is precluded by § 691(a)(2). A
transfer by consummation of a taxable executory sales contract does not present the same
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A similar problem concerning the effect of death on an incomplete
nontaxable transaction is presented in revenue ruling 64-161,102 which
holds that the nonrecognition-of-gain benefits of section 1033 do not
apply where the taxpayer who receives the proceeds of an involuntary
conversion dies and replacement of the converted property is there-
after made by a testamentary trustee. Section 1033 is ruled inapplicable
because the section contemplates a continuing investment by the same
taxpayer. 103 A supporting argument is advanced that section 1033's
substituted basis provisions, cost less unrecognized gain, conflict with
section 1014(a)'s requirement that the decedent's property obtain
a fair market value basis. The application of section 691 is implicitly
rejected because if section 691 applied to the involuntary conversion
proceeds the basis conflict would disappear by virtue of section 1014(c),
and section 691(a)(3) would presumably preserve the decedent's right
to a tax-free replacement of the converted property. As previously
noted,10 4 the application of section 691 would also produce the anom-
alous result of a section 1014(a) fair market value basis where decedent
dies before the involuntary conversion of his property into money,
a section 1014(c) decedent's basis where he dies after the involuntary
conversion but before reinvestment, and a section 1014(a) fair mar-
ket value basis where he dies after completion of the reinvestment.
The alternative, nonrecognition of the gain on decedent's final income
tax return under section 1033 and a section 1014(a) fair market value
basis for the replacement property, is ruled in contravention of the
substituted basis provisions of section 1033(c). Because section 691(a)(1)
prescribes that decedent's successors shall report income in respect of a
decedent when they receive it, the section evidently contemplates un-
reported and unreceived income. Nevertheless, where before death
decedent receives property, which is itself an item of gross income, sec-
tion 691 is sometimes applied so as to tax decedent's successors in the
same manner that decedent would have been taxed if he had lived. This
result is achieved by denying a section 1014(a) fair market value basis
for that part of the value of the property which represents income re-
ceived but not reported by the decedent. Since money cannot take a
conflict between §§ 691(a)(2) and (a)(3) as does a transfer by consummation of a tax-free
executory sales contract.
102 1964-1 Cumr. BuLL. 298. Cf. Rev. Rul. 67-355, 1967-2 Cum. BuLL. 296.
103 But see Goodman v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1952), which held that
§ 1083's predecessor allowed postponement of recognition of gain even though the rein-
vestment was made by the executor after the taxpayer's death. The court said, "[w1]e see
no reason why the executor may not do what the taxpayer could have done to perfect a
right which came into being in that final taxable period." Id. at 898.
104 See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
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basis less than its face value, section 691 is presumably not applicable
to income items which the decedent received but did not report before
death, such as involuntary conversion proceeds and certain option
payments. 0 5
PURCHASED RIGHTS TO INCOME
Whether or not a purchased right to recurring receipts is an item
of income in respect of a decedent in the hands of decedent's successors
is unclear. In 1953 it was said that "it is almost axiomatic that ...
[section 1014(a)] covers the capital assets of an individual which have
appreciated in value, such as his stocks, bonds and other investment
assets."'10 6 This result is no longer so clear. In Francis E. Latendresse0 7
the decedent had purchased a right to receive insurance renewal com-
missions. Decedent's successors were denied a section 1014(a) fair mar-
ket value basis on the ground that the right to payments was an item
of income in respect of a decedent because the income when received
upon collection of the premiums would have been ordinary income.
A right to receive insurance renewal commissions acquired in a liqui-
dation of a corporation was also held an item of income in respect
of a decedent in Abraham Goldstein.0 8 Where an author sold his
manuscript for a right to royalty payments based on sales, revenue
ruling 57-544109 held the right to be an item of income in respect of
a decedent because earned during the deceased author's life. Where
105 For property received as compensation see text at notes 42-71 supra; for property
received as rent see text at note 119 infra. Consideration received for options to purchase,
with the amount to be credited against the purchase price if the option is exercised, is
generally not taxable until the option lapses or is exercised because the proper tax treat-
ment, ordinary income or sales proceeds, may not be determined until the transaction is
closed. Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1938), cert.
denied, 307 U.S. 630 (1939). Thus, where the optionor receives such an option payment
and dies before the option is exercised or lapses, the tax treatment of such amount is
unclear. See Voegelin, supra note 87, at 769-70. Property subject to an unexercised option
to buy would not be treated as property representing a right to receive income in respect
of a decedent. See text at notes 87-88 supra.
An additional complexity with respect to money is that decedent's successors may
not receive the amount received but not reported by the decedent. In the partnership
area, however, the Internal Revenue Service treats that part of a deceased partner's
distributive share withdrawn before death as income in respect of a decedent and taxes
it to his successors in interest. Treas. Reg. § 1.753-1(b) (1960).
106 Holland, supra note 19, at 368.
1o 26 T.C. 318, 326 (1956), aft'd, 243 F.2d 577 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 830
(1957), acquiesced in, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 4.
108 33 T.C. 1032 (1960), acquiesced in, 1960-2 Cum. BuLL. 5.
109 1957-2 CuM. Burr. 261, as amplified by Rev. Rul. 60-227, 1960-1 Cums. Buxi. 262.
Compare Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 174, 176, 179, example 3, involving deferred
compensation.
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decedent during his lifetime received in a liquidation of a corporation
a right to royalty payments based on net profits from a patented pin-
setter device, which the liquidating corporation had sold to another
corporation, the right to royalty payments in the hands of decedent's
successors was held to be a right to income in respect of a decedent. 10
Classification as income in respect of a decedent resulted from the
facts that decedent's executor performed no activities with respect
to the right to the royalty payments; that the amounts in question were
attributable to the liquidating corporation's economic activity, as
passed through to the deceased shareholder upon liquidation; and that
the liquidating corporation's activities and efforts gave rise to a right
to receive such income."' All purchase price payments received under
decedent's sales contracts, completed or executory at death, regardless
of whether the method of payment is a single payment in a fixed
amount, installment payments, royalty payments based on the amount
or value of production, or payments tied to net profits from the trans-
ferred property, are income in respect of a decedent because decedent
possessed a right, contingent or otherwise, to the payments and the
payments are the products of decedent's lifetime activities. One may
predict that purchased rights to similar payments will also be income
in respect of a decedent.
Similarly, claims in litigation at decedent's death for income lost
by the decedent during his lifetime because of violations of the anti-
trust laws or infringement of his patents are items of income in respect
of a decedent." 2 The basis for the conclusion is, apparently, that dece-
dent had a contingent right to the income and had he lived such
amount would have been taxable to him." 3 On the other hand, one
decision held that where decedent's successors in interest receive a
payment in settlement of a posthumous breach of decedent's contract
to sell a partnership interest at death, such amount is not income in
respect of a decedent because decedent never possessed a right to the
payment." 4
110 Stephen H. Dorsey, 49 T.C. 606 (1968).
ill Id. at 632-33.
112 Carter v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 910
(1962); Rev. Rul. 55-463, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 277. See also Edna S. Ullnman, 34 T.C. 1107,
1114 (1960), holding an award from the Mixed Claims Commission under the provisions
of the Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928 income in respect of a decedent.
113 Carter v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 910
(1962); Edna S. Ullman, 34 T.C. 1107, 1114 (1960). With this standard compare Holland,
supra note 19, at 368: "Section ... [691] cannot include every item of income and of ap-
predation in value of assets, i.e., [it] cannot encompass all of gross income, since there
would then be no room left for section ... [1014(a)]."
314 Mandel v. Sturr, 266 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1959). Damage payments under an execu-
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Both Levin v. United States 15 and Marshal L. Noel'1 char-
acterized discount income as interest and held accrued discount
income to be income in respect of a decedent. 1" 7 Levin v. United States
also held that unearned discount income is not income in respect of a
decedent. In Levin decedent had purchased interest-bearing mortgage
notes at a discount and at his death the fair market value of the notes
exceeded his basis. A section 1014(a) fair market value basis was ac-
quired for the notes because unearned discount income is unearned in-
terest, which is not income in respect of a decedent unless earned before
death, and which, like appreciation on common stock, is includible
in the successor's section 1014(a) basis." 8 Levin v. United States is
irreconcilable with Francis E. Latendresse, where purchased insurance
renewal commissions were classified as income in respect of a decedent
in the hands of decedent's successors and therefore denied a section
1014(a) fair market value basis at decedent's death.
RIGHTS TO INCOME UNDER LEASES AND LICENSES
Crops and livestock share rents of a deceased cash basis landlord
are income in respect of a decedent"19 unlike the crops and livestock
tory contract to sell during life but breached after death would appear to be income in
respect of a decedent under Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ross, 392 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1967).
115 373 F.2d 434 (Ist Cir. 1967).
116 50 T.C. 702 (1968).
117 If original issue discount is interest, its treatment as income in respect of a de-
cedent where accrued is dear. But if original issue discount realized on a sale or redemp-
tion of corporate obligations is to be treated as gain from the sale of a noncapital asset,
as is apparently required by regulation § 1.61-7(c) and § 1232(a)(2), dassification as income
in respect of a decedent because accrued is improper since there is no basis for accruing
gain from a sale until the sale has occurred. Section 1232(a)(2) was not applicable in
Marshal L. Noel. See De Kosmian, Original Issue Discount, 22 ABA TAX SECrION BULL.
339, 345 (1969).
118 373 F.2d at 437, 439. In a representative example used by the court, decedent, a cash
basis taxpayer, lends $8,000 for a $10,000 note plus 6% interest payable over four years.
As he receives payments on account of the face amount, i.e., excluding the 6% interest, he
allocates 80% to discounted principal and 20% to discount income, reporting the latter
in the year received. When he dies at the end of the second year he has received $4,000
on the face amount of the note, of which 80% or $3,200 was allocated to discounted
principal, and 20% or $800 was allocated to discount income; the total accrued discount
income was $1,000. Thus, at death the unpaid discounted principal was $4,800, and un-
paid discount income was $1,200, of which $200 is income in respect of a decedent because
earned before death. The note is valued at $5,580 for estate tax purposes and this value,
less the $200 of income in respect of a decedent, is the § 1014(a) basis.
On the valuation of notes for estate tax purposes, see Rev. Rul. 67-276, 1967-2 Cumt.
BULL. 321.
119 Davis v. United States, 68-2 USTC 9483 (S.D. IM. 1968); Davison v. United
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of a farmer, which as property owned at death acquire a section 1014(a)
fair market value basis.120 Accrued rental or royalty income of a
deceased cash basis lessor'2 ' or licensor 22 is income in respect of a dece-
dent. But unlike rights to payments for decedent's services or rights
to payments for completed or executory sales, income from leases or
licenses is treated as income in respect of a decedent only to the ex-
tent accrued to the date of death. Unaccrued rents and royalties under
leases and licenses are not income in respect of a decedent because
they are not earned during decedent's life but are instead considered
as income earned after the date of death by property passing to the
estate. 123 Thus, rights transferred under leases and licenses are equated
with retained rights and acquire a section 1014(a) fair market value
basis in the hands of the deceased lessor's or licensor's successors in
interest. If the property leased or licensed by a decedent is depreciable,
the successors may recover its value at the decedent's death by deduct-
ing an allowance for depreciation from the income that it produces
before computation of taxes.124 On the other hand, rights-to unaccrued
payments under a partnership's lease or license will probably be con-
States, 292 F.2d 937 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Rev. Rul. 64-289, 1964-2
Com. BULL. 173.
120 Tom L. Burnett, 2 T.C. 897 (1943), acquiesced in, 1944 CtrM. Burr. 4, as applied
to § 691 by Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958-2 Com. BuLL. 366, 367-68, modified, Rev. Rul. 64-289,
1964-2 Com. Burr. 173. Revenue ruling 64-289, 1964-2 Com. BULL. 173, 175, specifically
states that it is not applicable to crops or livestock "received in a sharing arrangement
in which the landowner, as well as the tenant, participates materially in the farming
operation."
121 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.691(a)-l(b)(1), (2) (1965); National Bank of Commerce v. Mathis,
61-2 USTC 9744 (E.D. Ark. 1961); Ostella Carruth, 28 T.C. 871, 877 (1957), acquiesced
in, 1957-2 Com. BULL. 4.
122 Rev. Rul. 60-227, 1960-1 Cumo. BULL. 262.
123 Id.; Levin v. United States, 373 F.2d 434 (Ist Cir. 1967) (dictum); United States v.
Ellis, 264 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1959) (dictum); Grill v. United States, 303 F.2d 922 (Ct. Cl.
1962), discussed in note 73 supra. To the contrary is Davison v. United States, 292
F.2d 937 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961), where the decedent died on
December 24th with rents owing on two farm leases which ran for the calendar year.
The court treated the cash and crop shares received by the estate as income in respect of
a decedent because the rents were attributable to pre-death economic activities and were
unaccrued at the lessor's death solely because they were not ascertainable in amount.
However, revenue ruling 64-289, 1964-2 Cua. B.LL. 173, provides that crop and livestock
share rents attributable to a rental period after the lessor's death are not income in
respect of a decedenL
124 E.g., the devisees of a building subject to a long-term lease may, under § 1014(a)
and § 167(g), take the fair market value of the inherited building at the time of death
and recover its value by deducting an allowance for depreciation from the income it
produces before computation of taxes. While the rent for the entire term is attributable
to a contract executed during decedent's lifetime, posthumous rent is considered as in-
come produced by the inherited building and is not income in respect of a decedent.
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sidered unrealized receivables and treated as income in respect of a
decedent.1 25 One court has held that the statutory definition of "un-
realized receivables" includes a right to future payments under an
exclusive movie distribution contract. 26
When property subject to a lease is inherited, a separate basis
for the leasehold is usually denied on the ground that its value can-
not be separated from the value of the reversion.12 7 Amortization of
the leasehold is therefore denied, and the right to depreciation deduc-
tions depends on the nature of the property that produces the in-
come.128 But if property subject to a favorable lease is inherited, or
if a leasehold distinct from the reversion is inherited, there is authority
allowing amortization of the leasehold. A devisee who inherits a
favorable lease possesses the lease as an asset separate from the under-
lying property, and may amortize over the remaining term of the lease
that part of the value of the inherited property attributable to the
difference between the high rentals being obtained under the lease
and those which could be obtained at the time of inheritance. 29 Sim-
ilarly, where the decedent subleased property which he had leased, the
devisee of the leasehold was allowed to amortize the value of the lease-
hold over its remaining term.8 0 The premium value of a favorable
125 Section 753 provides that § 736(a) payments to a successor in interest of a de-
ceased partner are income in respect of a decedent. Section 736(b)(2)(A) provides that
payments for unrealized receivables, as defined in § 751(c), are § 736(a) payments. Rights
to unaccrued rent or royalty payments for the use of property are neither for goods to
be delivered nor for services to be rendered and therefore fall outside the literal scope
of § 751(c). Nevertheless, no reason for distinguishing under § 751(c) between rights to
payments under these different kinds of executory contracts is evident, and Roth v. Com-
missioner, 821 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1963), refused to do so.
126 Roth v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1963) (alternative holding).
127 Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) (inherited building subject to lease
providing fair market value rentals); cf. William R. Farmer, 1 B.T.A. 711 (1925) (taxpayer
purchased land, then rented it; depreciation of cost denied because upon termination of
the lease taxpayer still owns the land). See Rubin, Depreciation of Property Purchased
Subject to a Lease, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1134 (1952).
128 E.g., the value of an inherited building subject to a lease is depreciable whereas
the value of inherited land subject to a lease is not.
129 Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 847 U.S. 942
(1954), on remand, 14 T.C.M. 869 (1955); Goelet v. United States, 7 CCH 1967 STAND. FED.
TAx REP. 8159 (Commissioner's Report, Ct. Cl. 1967). To the contrary are Schubert v.
Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 866 U.S. 960 (1961); Friend v. Com-
missioner, 119 F.2d 959 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 673 (1941). See generally Rubin,
supra note 127; Comment, Depreciation of Property Acquired Subject to a Long Term
Lease, 42 TExAs L. REv. 72 (1963); Note, 67 HARV. L. REv. 894 (1954).
130 John W. F. Hobbs, 16 T.C. 1259 (1951), nonacquiesced in, 1951-2 Cum. BuLL. 5.
The devisee owned one-fifth of the property subject to the lease and the court allowed
amortization of only four-fifths of the value of the leasehold.
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lease and a leasehold inherited apart from the reversion are rights to
income possessed by decedent at death and attributable to decedent's
lifetime economic activities. Nevertheless, in the two cases where the
argumefit was possible, the government has not asserted that such Tights
are income in respect of a decedent.181 Instead, it concedes a section
1014(a) basis for the interest transferred, thus treating it as a retained
interest, and argues that the owner of a fee cannot separate, for pur-
poses of depreciation, the value of a lease from the value of the re-
version.
As previously discussed, 32 all purchase price payments under de-
cedent's sales contracts, completed or executory at death, regardless
of the method of payment, are income in respect of a decedent because
earned during the decedent's life. Why payments accruing after death
under decedent's leases and licenses are unearned and not income in
respect of a decedent is unclear. Sales, leases, and licenses are simply
alternate methods employed by decedent during his lifetime for re-
alizing economic gain from his property. Characterization of payments
as "sales proceeds," "rents," or "royalties" cannot resolve the income-
in-respect-of-a-decedent issue because that issue depends on whether
decedent possessed a conditional right to the income and whether
the payments are attributable to decedent's lifetime activities. An-
swers to these questions are not supplied by a characterization of the
payments. Methods of payment under a lease or license are indistin-
guishable from methods of payment under sales contracts. Either
may be a single payment in a fixed amount, installment payments,
royalty payments based on the amount or value of production, or pay-
ments tied to net profits from the transferred property. While a lease
or license involves a temporal division of the property, a section 1014(a)
fair market value basis for the reversion is conceded with the issue
being the income tax treatment of the right to payments for the
interest transferred.133 Similarly, where property is divided by use a
131 Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 960
(1961); John W. F. Hobbs, 16 T.C. 1259 (1951), nonacquiesced in, 1951-2 Cum. BULL. 5.
The other cases, Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
US. 942 (1954), Friend v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 959 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
673 (1941), and Goelet v. United States, 7 CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 8159 (Com-
missioner's Report, Ct. Cl. 1967), concerned devises which antedated § 126.
182 See text at notes 72-118 supra.
133 The crucial question is normally whether the transferred rights or the substituted
right to payments therefor will receive a § 1014(a) fair market value basis or a § 1014(c)
decedents basis. In Charles G. Barnes, 8 B.T.A. 360 (1927), nonacquiesced in, VII-1 Cum.
BUL. 86, 40 (1928), a case antedating § 126, the decedent had sold a patent for a right to
xoyalty payments, and the royalty contract acquired a fair market value basis in the hands
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section 1014(a) basis is conceded for uses retained, i.e., not sold, leased,"
or licensed by the decedent. When the contract, whether a sale, lease,
or license, was executed, decedent during his lifetime obtained at least
a contingent right to the payments. Payments under leases and licenses
are as much the product of decedent's lifetime activities as purchase-
price payments. The extent and nature of obligations performable
by decedent's successors in interest under a sales contract may be more
or less than the obligations performable under a lease or license.
Moreover, characterization of payments as sales proceeds, rents,
or royalties, for purposes of section 691 classification, introduces need-
less artificial distinctions and uncertainty. The reference to a sale in
revenue ruling 60-227,134 which interprets section 691 to apply to un-
accrued royalties from sales but not licenses, presumably refers to
transfers constituting sales for tax purposes and not to state law
definitions. Concerning patents and copyrights, the tax definition of
"sale" is broad, including exclusive licenses of rights under a patent
or copyright. 135 But in transactions involving mineral interests the
tax definition of "sale" is narrow. These varying tax definitions of
"sale" will produce unequal income tax treatment between estates
owning different kinds of rental property. Thus, posthumous royalties
resulting from conveyances treated as sales, such as a copyright owner's
grant of an exclusive license to exploit the copyrighted work in a
medium of publication throughout the life of the copyright, will be
income in respect of a decedent because earned during life, while
posthumous royalties resulting from conveyances treated as leasing
transactions, such as a landowner's sale of the minerals reserving some
form of cost-free interest in the nature of a royalty,136 or a lessee's
assignment of his interest reserving a fractional cost-free share in pro-
of decedent's successors. In John L. Whitehurst, 12 B.T.A. 1416 (1928), nonacquiesced in,
VIII-1 Cum. Bur.. 62 (1929), another case antedating § 126, the decedent had granted an
exclusive license to use certain patents in exchange for a right to royalty payments, and
the patents subject to the license received a fair market value basis in the hands of
decedent's successors.
With some assets the § 691 classification issue also affects the character of the in-
come. For example, copyright rights in the estate's hands, unlike in the author's hands are
capital assets under § 1221(3), unless § 691(a)(3) applies.
'34 1960-1 CuM. BuLL. 262. This ruling described an author's transfer of publication
rights as a sale. For discussion see Earl & Middleditch, Copyrights and the Author's Es-
tate, 53 A.B.A.J. 366, 569-70 (1967).
135 § 1235 and Rev. Rul. 58-358, 1958-2 Curt. BuLL. 408, dealing with patents; Rev.
Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 Cum. Burr. 26, dealing with copyrights.
136 United States v. White, 401 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1968); GCM 27322, 1952-2 Cum.
BuLL. 62. See also Galvin, The "Ought" and "Is" of Oil-and-Gas Taxation, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 1441, 1484 & n.183 (1960).
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duction, 3 7 are not income in respect of a decedent because they have
not been earned during life.138 Similarly, payments received in dis-
charge of retained production payments would not be income in re-
spect of a decedent because a production payment as a retained eco-
nomic interest in the minerals is the antithesis of a sale.' 39 In addition,
whether a transfer is a lease or sale can be unclear, and genuinely con-
tingent contracts, such as leases with options to purchase, will require
special treatment. 4 0
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Any rights to income attributable to decedent's services rendered
while living are income in respect of a decedent because both the right
to the income and its receipt are attributable solely to decedent's ser-
vices. Concerning partnerships, consideration received for the value
of decedent's right to render services in the future under contracts in
existence at death is also income in respect of a decedent. Property
received during life as compensation for services, but not taxed before
death because of restrictions precluding valuation or because of a stat-
utory exclusion from income conditioned on a reduction in basis,
should be treated in the hands of decedent's successors as income in
respect of a decedent. This appears to be the treatment accorded in
most cases.
Rights to payments under completed sales, and under executory
contracts to sell, except where by the terms of the contract the sale is
to occur only after death, are income in respect of a decedent. The
government distinguishes executory contracts to sell after death from
other executory sales contracts because, in its view, section 691 is only
applicable where the decedent intended to realize income during his
137 GCM 22730, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 214, 216.
138 Cf. Rev. Rul. 66-348, 1966-2 Cum. BuLL. 433, holding that proceeds received by
an estate from the extraction and sale of minerals during the alternate valuation period
do not constitute amounts to which a decedent was entitled as gross income and there-
fore cannot constitute income in respect of a decedent.
139 2 H. WLLkAms & C. MEYERs, OiL AND GAs LAW § 422 (1968); Rev. Rul. 60-19,
1960-1 CuM. BuLL. 251.
140 J. Strickland & Co. v. United States, 352 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 950 (1966) (contract in the form of a license of trademarks with option to purchase
held a contract of sale); Kitchin v. Commissioner, 353 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1965) (genuinely
contingent lease-or-purchase agreement treated as lease until option to purchase is
exercised); Note, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Equipment Lease-Or-Purchase Agree-
ments, 52 VA. L. REv. 1336, 1350-59 (1966). Revenue ruling 55-540, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 39,
provides economic tests to be applied when the issue is whether the taxpayer should be
treated as the owner or lessee of equipment which he in form rents as lessee.
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lifetime and, but for his death, would have done so. The basis for the
distinction is questionable. Concerning partnerships, the same rules
apply with three variations: rights to payments under sales of capital
assets are not income in respect of a decedent, rights to payments
otherwise income in respect of a decedent remain so where a partner-
ship interest is to be liquidated only after the partner's death, and
rights to payments for potential section 617, 1245, and 1250 gain
are also income in respect of a decedent. Evidently, all sales proceeds
received under decedent's contracts, completed or executory at death,
regardless of the method of payment, are considered income in respect
of a decedent because decedent possessed at least a contingent right
to the payments and the payments are considered attributable to dece-
dent's lifetime activities.
Purchased rights to income will probably be considered anal-
ogous to gain on a sale and treated as income in respect of a decedent.
Several cases have classified purchased rights to income as income in
respect of a decedent, but the reasons for such classification are unclear.
Levin v. United States141 held that unearned discount income was not
income in respect of a decedent, but the court characterized the dis-
count income as interest.
Interest payments and payments under leases and licenses are
not income in respect of a decedent unless accrued before death. Ac-
crual accounting is adopted as an exclusive test, with income accrued
after death considered as income produced by the property passing to
the estate. The criteria used to classify other kinds of income as income
in respect of a decedent-whether or not decedent possessed a condi-
tional right to the proceeds and the relationship between decedent's ac-
tivities and receipt of the proceeds-are abandoned without explana-
tion. The basis for distinguishing rights to payments under leases and
licenses from rights to payments under sales contracts or employment
contracts is unclear. Characterization of income as sales proceeds, rent,
or royalty income is difficult, and different property interests receive
different income tax treatment because of the multiple tax definitions
of sale and lease. The partnership definition of income in respect of
a decedent probably includes rights to payments under leases and lic-
enses.
A few tax planning points concerning the acquisition of a section
1014(a) fair market value basis are evident. Leasing, licensing, or bor-
rowing against appreciated assets is preferable to a pre-death sale or
contract to sell. When a sale is desired, division of the property either
141 373 F.2d 434 (1st Cir. 1967).
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temporally or by use will preserve the possibility of a section 1014(a)
basis for the unsold rights in the event of death. A provision nullifying
a contract to sell upon the seller's death should be considered, espe-
cially where a substantial period will elapse between execution of the
contract and its consummation. Sales of capital assets on a deferred
payment basis should be made through partnerships. Installment obli-
gations arising from an individual's sale of capital assets which are
contributed to a partnership may elude section 691. Property subject
to the depreciation recapture rules should be owned individually and
not by a partnership.
Section 126, adopted in 1942, established for the first time that
unrealized appreciation on certain property, referred to as items of
gross income in respect of a decedent, would no longer escape income
taxes because of the death of the owner. The rule was carried over into
section 691 of the 1954 Code and today occupies a substantial area
formerly held by section 1014(a). Under the current concept of in-
come in respect of a decedent, acquisition of a section 1014(a) fair
market value basis or retention of a section 1014(c) decedent's basis
does not depend solely on a distinction between property and rights
to income but also depends on distinctions between rights to different
kinds of income. Thus, the successor's income tax bill, like the estate
tax bill, depends to a considerable degree not on the value of what
decedent leaves, but on how he leaves it.
